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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Morris argued that the district court had jurisdiction to 
"commute" his sentence and place him on probation pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 
33(d) and Idaho Code Section 19-2601 (4). He also argued that the district court abused 
its discretion when it denied his Idaho Criminal Rule 35 (hereinafter, I.C.R. 35) motion 
requesting leniency and when it concluded it would have denied his I.C.R. 33(d) motion 
on the merits. This brief is necessary to reply to the State's argument that a district 
court does not have the authority to commute a sentence after the sentence has been 
imposed and executed. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
After the State filed its Respondent's Brief, Mr. Morris filed a pro se Affidavit of 
Genuine Issue of Material Fact, which is being withdrawn from this Court's 
consideration. 
Otherwise, the statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously 
articulated in Mr. Morris's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply 
Brief, but are incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
1 
ISSUES 
1) Did the district court have jurisdiction to "commute" Mr. Morris' sentence pursuant 
to Idaho Criminal Rule 33(d) and Idaho Code Section 19-2601 (4)? 1 
2) Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Morris's request for 
probation, made pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 35? 
3) Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Morris' Idaho 
Criminal Rule 33(d) motion on its merits? 




The District Court Had Jurisdiction To "Commute" Mr. Morris' Sentence Pursuant To 
Idaho Criminal Rule 33(d) And Idaho Code Section 19-2601(4) 
A. Introduction 
In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Morris argued that, pursuant to, I.C.R. 33(d) and 
I.C. § 19-2601(4), the district court had jurisdiction for one year to suspend his sentence 
and place him on probation. At the time, he used the term "commute" as a shorthand 
way of describing the action he was requesting the district court to perform. In 
retrospect, "commute" was a poor choice of words, as it has a specific meaning under 
LC. § 19-2601(1).2 Nevertheless, the substance of his argument remains sound. The 
first sentence of I.C. § 19-2601 (4) provides the district court up to one year after the 
entry of judgment to suspend the defendant's sentence and place him on probation. In 
other words, I.C. § 19-2601 (4) extends the district court's jurisdiction for one year. 
B. The District Court Had Jurisdiction To "Commute" Mr. Morris' Sentence Pursuant 
To Idaho Criminal Rule 33(d) And Idaho Code Section 19-2601 (4) 
The State argues that the district court correctly concluded that it did not have 
jurisdiction to consider Mr. Morris' Rule 33(d) motion. (Respondent's Brief, pp.8-10.) In 
support of this assertion, it relies on State v. Starry, 130 Idaho 834 (1997), the facts of 
which the State asserts are analogous to Mr. Morris' case. (Respondent's Brief, p.10.) 
Contrary to the State's assertion, Starry is distinguishable. In Starry, the defendant 
pleaded guilty to two counts of kidnapping. Id. at 835. Eighteen years later, Mr. Starry 
2 Under I.C. § 19-2601 (1 ), "commutation" entails imposing sentence and placing the 
defendant in county jail instead of prison. 
3 
"filed a pro se self-styled 'petition to commute sentence' in the district court citing 
I.C. §§ 19-2601 and 19-2523." Id. (original emphasis). The district court denied the 
motion without a hearing and Mr. Starry appealed. Id. The Court of Appeals affirmed 
the district court's decision based on its conclusion that the district court had no 
authority to commute a sentence once it has been imposed and executed, as that 
authority rests with Idaho's executive branch. Id. The Court also held that the 
defendant's motion was, in substance, an untimely I.C.R. 35 motion. Id. This case is 
distinguishable from Starry because Mr. Morris filed his I.C.R. 33(d) motion within one 
year of the judgment of conviction. 
This distinction is relevant because Mr. Morris is arguing that I.C. § 19-2601 (4) 
extends the district court's jurisdiction to suspend a sentence for one year after the 
issuance of the judgment of conviction. The defendant in Starry relied on no rule to 
extend the district court's jurisdiction over his case as he filed it eighteen years after the 
entrance of the judgment of conviction. Since there was no rule to extend the district 
court's jurisdiction for eighteen years, the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the district 
court. For that reason, Starry is inapposite when compared to the facts of this case. 
Additionally, the Starry opinion is inapposite because it neither addressed the 
specific language of I.C. § 19-2601 (4) nor the argument being advanced by Mr. Morris. 
The Starry opinion did not recite the specific arguments proffered by Mr. Starry, so there 
is no way of knowing if the Starry Court was addressing the specific issues advanced by 
Mr. Morris. Moreover, it really would not matter because Mr. Starry filed his motion to 
commute his sentence eighteen years after the entry of judgment, and as stated above, 
4 
that late filing would prevent Mr. Starry prevailing under the theory advanced by 
Mr. Morris. 
Mr. Morris' reliance on the first sentence of I.C. § 19-2601 (4) is in harmony with 
the other commonly accepted methods utilized to extend a district court's jurisdiction. 
For example, a district court can retain jurisdiction for a year, and at the end of that year 
decide whether to suspend a defendant's sentence and place the defendant on 
probation. In the event probation is ordered at the time of sentencing, or after a period 
of retained jurisdiction, the district court's jurisdiction can extend for years if the 
defendant is successful on probation. A district court's power to reduce a sentence 
pursuant to a timely I.C.R. 35 motion can extend for a period of time longer than a year, 
in the event there is a justification for the delay. State v. Fisch, 142 Idaho 781 (Ct App. 
2006). 
In sum, Starry is distinguishable because the motion to commute in that case 
was filed eighteen years after the sentence was imposed and executed, and because 
Mr. Starry did not rely on either a statute or rule which extended the district court's 
jurisdiction over his case. Conversely, Mr. Morris filed his I.C.R. 33(d) motion within a 
year of the entry of judgment and the district court's jurisdiction over this case was 
extended by I.C. § 19-2601 (4). Therefore, the district court had jurisdiction to rule on 
the merits of Mr. Morris' I.C.R. 33(d) motion to suspend his sentence. 
5 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Morris respectfully requests that this Court remand this matter to the district 
court with instructions to review the merits of Mr. Morris' !.C.R. 33(d) motion. 
Alternatively, Mr. Morris respectfully requests that this Court remand this case with 
instructions to place Mr. Morris on probation. Alternatively, Mr. Morris respectfully 
requests that this Court reduce the fixed portion of his sentence. 
DATED this 19th day of October, 2012. 
SHAWN WILKERSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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